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* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Professor PeterB. Maggs provided helpful advice and comments.1 See U .C.C. § 2-313(1)(b)-(1)(c) (2004) (saying that any “description of thegoods” and any “sample or model” which is “made part of the basis of the bargaincreates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to [the description orsample or model.]”).2 This essay is part of a symposium, called “Commercial Calamities: What IHate Most About Commercial Law,” which took place at the American Associationof Comparative Law’s annual meeting on January 7, 2006 in Washington, D.C.
Citation: 68 Ohio St. L.J. 201 (2007) 
Symposium: Commercial Calamities A COMPLAINT ABOUT PAYMENT LAW UNDER THE U.C.C.:WHAT YOU SEE IS OFTEN NOT WHAT YOU GET Gregory E. Maggs* In this Essay, Professor Maggs observes that many provisions ofU.C.C. Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 5 are misleading. Although theprovisions express certain rules, these rules often actually do notapply because the parties have waived them, because the parties haveno practical way to enforce them, or because they are predicated onunrealistic assumptions. Professor Maggs laments that this discrep-ancy between what the U.C.C. says and reality may have deceivedthe state legislatures that voted to enact the U.C.C., that it mayimpose costs on businesses and consumers, and that it clearlyhinders the education of lawyers and law students. He suggests thatthe U.C.C. would be improved if it stated more candidly andaccurately the rules that actually apply in real transactions.
I. Introduction Sellers of goods frequently comfort wary potential buyers by assuringthem that “what you see is what you get.” In other words, there will be nosurprises. If a carton label shows a picture of twelve widgets, the buyer canexpect to find the same number of widgets inside the carton. If a can ofpaint displays a beige stripe, the can will contain beige paint of the samecolor. Indeed, commercial law generally holds sellers to this uncontrover-sial standard.1 So what is my lament about the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)?2It is that what you see in Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 5 of the U.C.C.-the articles
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3 Other articles of the U.C.C. also may share this problem; this essay justaddresses provisions with which I am most familiar.4 U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (2002).5 U.C.C. § 3-102(a) (2004).6 Id. § 3-102 cmt. 1.
concerning payments of money and related topics-is often not what you getin real life.3  On the contrary, many of the rules in these articles are, in asense, imaginary; they are not the rules that govern normal commercialtransactions. Indeed, as the examples below will show, often the veryopposite rules are applicable. *202 This feature of the U.C.C. is annoying for several reasons. First,as this Essay will explain in more depth, when make-believe rules appearin a model code like the U.C.C., they work a kind of fraud on the legisla-tures that are asked to enact them. They convey a false image of what themodel law really will accomplish. Second, the unrealistic rules in theU.C.C. impose a variety of costs on consumers and businesses that engagein commercial transactions. They require parties to expend considerableeffort to contract out of and otherwise to work around legislation thatfamously was supposed “to simplify, clarify and modernize the lawgoverning commercial transactions.”4  Third, and perhaps most annoyingly,the inclusion of inapposite rules in the U.C.C. hinders legal education. Itgives unwary law students and lawyers trying to pick up the governingprinciples a very inaccurate summary of the actual law. II. Examples The following short list of examples illustrates various different waysin which what you see in Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 5 is not what you get in reallife. Example #1: Businesses and consumers issue billions of promissorynotes every year. In theory, U.C.C. Article 3 contains the rules that governthese important negotiable instruments. Certainly that is what statelegislatures thought when they enacted Article 3. The first substantiveprovision of Article 3, after all, promises that “[t]his Article applies tonegotiable instruments,”5  and the Official Comment extols this statementas a “provision affirmatively stating [the Article’s] scope.”6  But in reality,the rules in Article 3 often are not the rules that govern negotiableinstrument transactions. 
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7 Id. § 3-118.8 Id. § 3-118 cmt. 1.9 Id. § 3-118(a).10 See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Form 3200: Multistate Fixed Rate Note, at 3,http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/single/uniform/pdf/3200.pdf [hereinafter FreddieMac Standard Mortgage Note] (including the word “seal” in the signature line ofthe standard note form used for home mortgages throughout the country); SallieMae, LAWLOANS Private Loan Application and Promissory Note, at 3, http://www.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/67E74685-4A3D-4C9D-8CBB-C008977A4D55/6651/LS_SLMAInternational_completeapplications_interact.pdf [hereinafter SallieMae Standard Law School Student Loan Note] (including the word “seal” in thesignature line of the standard note form used for law school student loansthroughout the country); Beal Bank v. Lucks, 791 A.2d 752, 757 (Del. Ch. 2000)(including the word “seal” on the signature lines of another typical note). 11 See U.C.C. § 3-118(a) (2004) (addressing the statute of limitations withoutever mentioning seals o r their effect on the period of limitations). 12 See D .C. Code Ann. §  12-301(6) (LexisNexis 2001). 
Section 3-118, for instance, is (or rather appears to be) a comprehensivestatute of limitations.7  The section purports to specify all of the time limitsfor suing to enforce checks, notes, and other negotiable instruments. TheOfficial Comment says that the “purpose of Section 3-118 is to define thetime within which an action to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arisingunder Article 3 must be commenced.”8 Section 3-118(a) says that an action to enforce a note “payable at adefinite time must be commenced within six years after the due *203 date. . . stated in the note.”9  This straightforward language offers assurance thatif a borrower obtained a $100,000 loan from a bank and signed a notepromising to repay the money on January 1, 2006, the bank could notenforce the note in a lawsuit after January 1, 2012 (that is, more than sixyears later). But often, maybe more often that not, the reality is otherwise whenborrowers issue notes payable at a definite time. Banks commonly requireborrowers to sign the notes “under seal”; they do this simply by preprintingthe word “seal” next to the borrower’s signature line on their standardpromissory note form.10 This one word makes a big difference. Section3-118(a) does not say anything about seals.11  Instead, most jurisdictionshave a different statute, outside of the U.C.C., that applies to any obliga-tions (including notes) made under seal. In the District of Columbia, forinstance, the period of limitations for a contract made under seal is twelveyears.12  Thus, for many makers of notes payable at a definite time, what
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13 See, e .g., Milford Fertilizer Co. v. Hopkins, 807 A.2d 580, 583-84 (Del.Super. Ct. 2002) (extending the period of limitation for note containing the word“SEAL” to twenty years, not the six years specified in section 3-118(a)). 14 See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2004) (permitting a bank to charge a customer’saccounts only for checks that are “properly payable,” meaning authorized by thecustomer). 15 See id . § 4-406(f) (providing that a “customer who does not within one yearafter the statement or items are made available to the customer . . . discover andreport the customer’s unauthorized signature . . . is precluded from asserting againstthe bank the unauthorized signature”). 16 See, e .g., Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-53(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding reduction in time from one year to fourteen days).
they see in § 3-118(a)-a six year period of limitations-is not at all what theyactually get.13 Example #2: Every student of commercial law learns that a bankordinarily cannot charge a customer’s account for a check that is notproperly payable.14  This rule means that if a bank pays a check thatcontains a forged drawer’s signature or forged indorsement, the customertypically will not bear the loss. That is why checks are generally a safeform of payment. But suppose that a bank accidentally pays a forged check and improp-erly charges the customer’s account. Section 4-406(f) says that if thecustomer *204 wants to recover the money, the customer has one year toreport the unauthorized payment to the bank.15  In most instances, one yearshould be plenty of time for the customer to examine the bank statementand report improper payments. But it turns out that few, if any, bankcustomers actually have a full year because bank agreements almost alwaysshorten the period that the customer has from one year to a much shorterdeadline, such as sixty days or even fewer.16  The one year period,therefore, is all but imaginary. Is reducing the reporting period good or bad? It is hard to say. On onehand, a shorter period can impose a burden on customers if they do nothave enough time to review their statements. On the other hand, a shorterperiod may save the bank liability, keeping the costs of banking down forthose customers who do examine their statements promptly. The point here,though, is not that one period is better than the other. The point is that whatyou see in the U.C.C. is not what you get in reality. While the U.C.C. saysthat the period is one year, in almost all instances it actually is substantiallyless than one year. 
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17 U.C.C. § 3-406(a) (2004). 18 U.C.C. § 4-406(d) (2002). 19 U.C.C. § 3-405(b) (2004). 20 Id. § 3-406(b): [I]f the person asserting the preclusion fails to exercise ordinary care inpaying or taking the instrument and that failure substantially contributes toloss, the loss is allocated between the person precluded and the personasserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the failure of eachto exercise ordinary care contributed to  the loss. Id.; see also id. §§ 4-406(e), 3-405(b) (similar). 21 See id . § 4-401(a). 22 See id . § 3-406(a). 
Example #3: The properly payable rule discussed in Example #2immediately above has several exceptions. A customer, for instance, maybe “precluded” (that is, estopped) from asserting that a signature on a checkis forged-and thus that a check is not properly payable-if the customer’snegligence contributed to the making of the forgery,17  if the customer’sdelay in reporting the forgery caused certain kinds of losses,18  or if theforgery was committed by someone whom the customer had entrusted withresponsibility for handling the check.19 But Article 3 limits-or, rather, appears to limit-these exceptions in animportant way. With respect to each of the three exceptions just mentioned,Article 3 specifies that if the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in payingthe checks, then the customer will not bear all of the loss; instead, the bankand the customer will share the loss according to their respective fault.20*205 These limitations guarantee, or at least purport to guarantee, that abank will not be able to charge customers’ accounts for the full amount ofunauthorized checks when the bank itself has acted negligently. But inreality, despite what Article 3 appears to promise, these limitations willalmost never result in the imposition of liability on banks. Consider this common example: A bank pays a check containing aforged drawer’s signature and charges the customer’s account. Thecustomer asserts that the bank cannot charge the customer’s accountbecause the forgery made the check unauthorized and therefore notproperly payable.21  The bank responds that the customer should beprecluded from asserting that the check is not properly payable because thecustomer’s negligence substantially contributed to the making of theforgery.22  Perhaps the customer negligently left blank checks out whereothers could take them. If the customer in fact was negligent, the customerwill bear the loss. 
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23 See id . § 3-406(b). 24 See William D. W arren & Steven D. W alt, Commercial Law 826 (6th ed.2004). 25 See id . (explaining that the labor costs and the low rate of detecting errorsmake sight review of checks “not cost effective”). 26 See id. (reporting that banks have “abandoned sight review except for checksthat [meet] certain risk criteria, the principal one being the amount of the check”).27 For example, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp.,848  F.2d 291 , 294 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.), the policy was as follows: The Bank examines all signatures on checks for more than $1,000. Itexamines signatures on checks between $100 and $1,000 . . . if it has reasonto suspect a problem, e.g., if a customer has warned it of a possible forgeryor if the check was drawn on an account with insufficient funds. It examinesthe signatures of a randomly chosen one percent of all other checks between$100 and $1,000. But, it does not examine the signatures on other checksbetween $100  and $1,000. Id. 28 U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(9) (2004).
Here is where the limitations come in. The bank will have to share theloss if the customer can prove that the bank was also negligent in payingthe check.23  So how could the bank be negligent in paying a check?Usually when a bank pays a forged check, it has not examined the drawer’ssignature on the check.24  As an economic matter, banks cannot look at thesignatures on all of the checks that they pay; the process just takes toomuch time and effort.25  So instead banks generally adopt policies underwhich they selectively examine only a percentage of the checks that theypay.26  For instance, they may decide to verify the drawer’s signature on allchecks over $10,000 and one percent of checks under $10,000.27  Acustomer, however, *206 might assert that a bank’s failure to look at thesignature on a particular forged check was negligent. When is a bank’s policy on examining signatures on a check negligent?Section 3-103(a)(9) contains a specific rule on this point, a rule that affectsall of the limitations on the exceptions to the properly payable rule. Thesection says: In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing forcollection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercialstandards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if . . .the bank’s procedures do not vary unreasonably from generalbanking usage not disapproved by this Article or Article 4.28  I nother words, to prove that a bank failed to exercise ordinary care in
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29 See, e.g., Story Rd. Flea Mkt., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524,529, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the customer had not shown that thebank was negligent even though the customer “submitted evidence which purportedto establish that there is no industry standard for check processing systems becausethey are proprietary and each bank keeps its system secret”). 30 See § 3-104(e) (2004) (defining a “note” as a “promise”); id. § 3-103(a)(9)(defining a “promise” as “a written undertaking to pay money signed by the personundertaking to  pay”). 31 Id. § 3-501(a). 32 Id. § 3-501(b)(2). 
not examining a check, a customer would have to show that thebank’s policies on examining the drawer’s signature varied unrea-sonably from the policies of other banks (“general banking usage”).That sounds simple enough. But what section 3-103(a)(9) does notmention is that obtaining the proof necessary for this section to apply is allbut impossible. A customer generally cannot discover the policies followedby other banks because those policies are tightly held trade secrets.29  Anybank would run huge risks in revealing which checks it examines and whichchecks it does not; a criminal who discovered the policies could deviseforgery schemes to defeat them. Customers therefore typically have nofeasible way to show that their bank’s “procedures . . . vary unreasonablyfrom general banking usage.” In other words, when you look at thelimitations on the exceptions to the properly payable rule, what you see isnot actually what you get. Example #4: A borrower who takes out a loan typically signs a notepromising to repay the money.30 The borrower knows that when the loanbecomes due, the holder of the note will want payment. But before paying*207 the note, the borrower may want assurance that the payment is goingto the correct person and that the borrower will receive credit for any sumshanded over. The borrower may properly worry that the person demandingpayment is not entitled to payment because he or she already has negotiatedthe note to someone else who will later demand the money. Obviously, noborrower wants to pay a note twice. The U.C.C. takes borrowers’ concerns into account in section 3-501.This section defines a demand for payment of a note as a “presentment.”31It then says that “the person making presentment” (i.e., the creditordemanding that the borrower repay the note) must: “(i) exhibit theinstrument, (ii) give reasonable identification . . . and (iii) sign a receipt onthe instrument for any payment made or surrender the instrument if fullpayment is made.”32  These three important requirements ensure-or, rather,
A COMPLAINT ABOUT PAYMENT LAW8
33 See, e.g., Freddie Mac Standard Mortgage Note, supra note 10, § 9, at 2;(waiving presentment in the standard home mortgage note used throughout thecountry); Sallie M ae Standard Law School Student Loan Note, supra note 10, §M.5, at 11 (waiving presentment in the standard law school student loan note usedthroughout the country). 34 See W arren & Walt, supra note 24, at 596 (describing the holder in due courserule stated in § 3-305(b ) as the “most dramatic aspect” of the law governingnegotiable instruments). 
purport to ensure-that the borrower is paying someone who is in possessionof the note and that the borrower will not have to pay the note again tosomeone else. There is only one problem with this section: it’s a fantasy. Every monthmillions of homeowners make payments on the notes that they signed whenthey borrowed money to buy their houses. Millions of college graduatessimilarly make payments on their student loan notes. And millions ofdrivers and boaters pay down the notes that they signed when theyborrowed money to purchase automobiles or vessels. Yet, based on my ownfamiliarity with commercial practices, I suspect that none of theseborrowers sees the notes that they are paying. There is no “exhibition” ofthe instruments as section 3-501 requires. There is no showing of identifi-cation. In some cases, in my experience, there is no signing of a receipt forpayment. Instead, each month, the borrowers simply mail a check to anaddress that they have been given. This reality, which is completely contrary to the statute, has a simpleexplanation. Banks and other lenders would find the requirements ofsection 3-501 far too burdensome given the multitudes of borrowers locatedall over the country. So almost all mortgage notes, student loan notes, andauto/boat loan notes waive “presentment.” They simply dispense with therequirements stated above.33 This waiver of presentment probably makes good economic sense. Bothbanks and borrowers may save money by eliminating the costly step ofpresentment. Although borrowers lose some protection against fraudulentdemands for payment, the actual incidence of such fraud probably is notvery *208 great. But whether waiver of presentment is a good idea or not,it is a reality. And the rights that you see in section 3-501 are not what youactually get. Example #5: Section 3-305(b) is said to express one of the mostimportant rules governing negotiable instruments.34  The section concernsthe rights of a “holder in due course”-that is, someone who has acquired a
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35 See U .C.C. § 3-302(a) (2004) (defining holder in due course). 36 Section 3-305(b) says: “The right of a holder in due course to enforce theobligation of a party to pay the instrument is . . . not subject to defenses of theobligor stated in subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment . . . against a personother than the holder.” Id. § 3-305(b). The defenses stated in subsection (a)(2) areany defenses “that would be available . . . under a simple contract.” Id. §3-305(a)(2). 37 See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts §  336(1) (1981). By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only to theextent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor; and if the right of theassignor would be voidable by the obligor or unenforceable against him ifno assignment had been made, the right of the assignee is subject to theinfirmity. Id. 
negotiable instrument in good faith, for value, without notice of anydefenses.35  The section says that a holder in due course takes the negotia-ble instrument free from defenses and claims in recoupment that the makerof the instrument could have asserted against the assignee of an ordinarycontract.36 Here is a typical illustration. Suppose that a general contractor buys abulldozer from an equipment supplier on credit. The general contractorpromises to pay the purchase price by signing a promissory note. Theequipment supplier, needing cash to purchase additional inventory, thensells the note to a bank. If the bank is a holder in due course-that is, if thebank takes the note in good faith and without notice of claims anddefenses-the bank will not be subject to any ordinary contract defenses topayment that the general contractor would have. For instance, the generalcontractor could not assert the defense of failure of the consideration evenif the equipment supplier never delivered the bulldozer. The generalcontractor would have to pay the bank and would only have recourseagainst the supplier. But section 3-305(b) really is a half-truth. In saying that a holder in duecourse takes an instrument free from defenses, the section conveys the ideathat the assignees of promises to pay money who are not holders in duecourse of negotiable instruments take their assignments subject to ordinarycontract defenses. Sometimes that is true.37  Yet very often the reality isdifferent. A great many commercial contracts requiring one party to paymoney-such as a contract for the purchase or lease of property-contain
A COMPLAINT ABOUT PAYMENT LAW10
38 See Gregory E. Maggs, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine as a Default Rule,32 G a. L. Rev. 783, 798-800 (1997-1998) (discussing cut off clauses in depth). 39 The drafters of U.C.C. Article 5 attempted to prevent a similar misconceptionregarding letters of credit. They added the following sentence in section 5-103(b):“The statement of a rule in this article does not by itself require, imply, or negateapplication of the same or a different rule to a situation not provided for, or to aperson not specified, in this article.” U.C.C. §  5-103(b) (2004). Thus, readers ofArticle 5 should not conclude that rules applicable to letters of credit are inapplica-ble to other kinds of payment devices. 40 U.C.C. § 4-403(a) (2004). 41 In 2006-2007, the average price that a consumer would  pay to stop paymenton a check was $28.67. See Phoenix-Hecht, The Blue Book of Bank Prices2005-2006: Executive Summary 5, available at http://www.. com/treasuryresources/PDF/BBExecSumm.pdf (last visited Jan. 27 , 2007). 
so-*209 called “cut off” clauses.38  These clauses say that the partyagreeing to pay money will not assert defenses against the assignee of theright to payment. These clauses achieve essentially the same result as theholder in due course doctrine, without requiring all of the formalities ofnegotiable instruments. But again anyone just looking at the text of Article3, without knowing about the common alternative of cut off clauses, wouldget the wrong idea about what the U.C.C. accomplishes.39Example #6: Sometimes a bank customer who has written a checksubsequently discovers a reason that the payee should not receive themoney. For example, a homeowner may write a check to a roofer to pay forrepairs and then learn that the roofer did not actually complete the work. Inthis situation, a customer typically will want to stop payment on the check.Section 4-403 purports to give a customer the right to stop payment onany check, so long as the customer describes the check with reasonablecertainty and gives the bank sufficient time to act on the customer’s stoppayment order.40  But that is not the reality. All or nearly all banks requiretheir customers to pay them a fee to stop-payment on checks, often morethan $25 per check.41  If a customer went into a bank and requested that thebank stop payment on a check but refused to pay the stop payment fee, thebank would ignore the request. Thus, the customer does really not a haveright to stop payment. Instead, the customer merely has an opportunity topay to stop payment, just as a customer has an opportunity to pay to see amovie or to pay to put gasoline in a car. Banks can charge customers for stopping payment because customersroutinely agree to the charge in the contract that they sign when they open
A COMPLAINT ABOUT PAYMENT LAW 11
42 See U.C.C. § 4-103(a) (2004) (permitting parties, by agreement, to change theeffect of the provisions of Article 4, so long as they do not disclaim their duties toact in good faith and to exercise ordinary care). 43 Id. § 4-403 cmt. 1. 44 Id. § 4-403(c). 45 Id. 46 See, e.g., EverBank, Stop Payment Form, http://service-center.everbank.com/documents/eb_stop_payment0701.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (“FinancialInstitution is not liable to You if it pays the identified check or transfer if FinancialInstitution acted in good faith or exercised ordinary care.”); Bank of North Dakota,Stop Payment Request/Verification, http://www.banknd.com/ro/pdf/18492_2006(last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (“BN D shall be bound only to exercise good faith and
an account.42  Maybe the charge makes good economic sense because itkeeps *210 the cost of banking down for everyone. Or maybe it does not.But section 4-403 should not say that the customers have a right to stoppayment. That is make-believe. Even more ridiculous is the OfficialComment to section 4-403, which fantastically says that “stopping payment. . . is a service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive frombanks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense.”43 Example #7: Another example of a disconnection between what theU.C.C. says and actual practice also appears in the rules in section 4-403on stopping payment on checks. Suppose that a customer dutifully pays abank $25 to stop payment on a $1000 check, but the bank wrongfully failsto act on the stop-payment order. Section 4-403(c) indicates that thecustomer may recover from the bank in damages by showing a “lossresulting from the payment of an item contrary to a stop-payment order.”44How would a customer suffer a loss from a payment contrary to astop-payment order? In this hypothetical, until the customer learns what thebank has done, and demands the bank re-credit the account, the customermay believe that the account balance is $1000 greater than what the bankbelieves the balance to be. Accordingly, the customer might write checksthat the bank will refuse to pay for insufficient funds. The customer’sbounced checks may subject the customer to late fees, returned check fees,and other losses. But not to worry, section 4-403(c) promises-or, rather,purports to promise-that the customer’s recovery “may include damages fordishonor of subsequent items.”45 But of course the reality is different. Regardless of what section4-403(c) says, customers generally cannot recover from their banks whentheir banks fail to stop payment on checks. The reason is that bankstypically ask customers to sign a form when they want to stop payment.46
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ordinary care in the observation of this order.”). 47 True, under the U.C.C., a bank cannot legally waive its duty to exerciseordinary care or act in good faith. See U.C.C. § 4-403 cmt. 7. But a bank couldcause damages by failing to stop payment even without being negligent or acting inbad faith. For example, suppose a bank customer is defrauded into  issuing a checkfor $1000 to  a thief. After discovering the fraud, the customer tries to stop the thieffrom getting cash for the check by issuing a timely stop-payment order to the bank.But the bank fails to stop payment because the bank’s computers fail through nofault of the bank. As a result, the thief is able to cash the check and obtain themoney. The bank charges the customer’s account $1000. In this case, the customerhas suffered $1000 in damages even though the bank was not negligent and did notact in bad faith. An agreement like the ones cited in the previous footnote wouldplace  this loss on the customer rather than the bank. 48 U.C.C. § 5-103(a) (2004). 49 See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 371, 391 & n.71(2003). 
This form almost inevitably waives the bank’s liability for disregarding astop-payment order.47  So again what you see in section 4-403 is not whatyou get in reality. *211 Example #8: On the subject of half-truths, perhaps the mostmisleading one appears in section 5-103(a). This provision specifies thescope of Article 5 as follows: “This article applies to letters of credit andto certain rights and obligations arising out of transactions involving lettersof credit.”48  But the reality is different. Well more than ninety percent ofletters of credit issued in the United States, in both domestic and interna-tional transactions, contain a legend saying that they are governed not byU.C.C. Article 5, but instead by a set of standard terms privately promul-gated by the International Chamber of Commerce.49  Yet, looking just atsection 5-103(a), you would not get that idea. III. Assessment The examples described above illustrate how what you see in the U.C.C.is often not what you actually get. Some rules do not apply because theparties routinely waive them by contract. Other rules create rights thatparties have little practical way to enforce. Still other rules are misleadinghalf-truths. A separate question, though, is why a discrepancy between the U.C.C.and reality is something to complain about. The answer is somewhatcomplicated. 
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50 See U.C.C. § 1-302(a)-(b) (2004) (saying that the “effect of provisions of [theUniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement,” with exception that the“obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [theUniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement”). 51 The American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commis-sioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) have drafted the U.C.C. and its revisionsand amendments as model legislation. They present this model legislation to thestate legislatures for enactment into law. For more about how this process hasworked, see Gregory E. M aggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurispru-dence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541, 545-52 (2000).
The problem is not that the U.C.C. allows parties to alter its rules bycontract.50  On the contrary, that is almost always a good thing. Statutoryrules that can be changed or waived give parties freedom. A bank and itscustomer, for example, may agree that the customer can stop payment onchecks without charge or they may decide that the customer must pay a feeto stop payment. Given freedom to choose, the parties will presumablychoose the options that make the most economic sense for them. *212 The problem with Articles 3, 4, 4A, and 5 also is not that thediscrepancy between the U.C.C. and the real world creates confusionamong parties engaged in payment transactions. Most parties to commercialtransactions, whether they are businesses or consumers, have never read theU.C.C. They do not even know what the U.C.C. is or where to find it. Soeven if the U.C.C. expresses unrealistic rules, these rules cannot misleadthem. In fact, in an ironic manner, unrealistic provisions in the U.C.C.theoretically could reduce confusion in commercial transactions. When theU.C.C. contains a rule at odds with usual business practices, parties tocommercial transactions typically waive the rule by contract, often in aform contract drafted by a lawyer who knows exactly what the U.C.C. says.A provision in a contract, even a preprinted form contract, is likely toprovide more notice to the parties of commercial transactions than aprovision in a statute. While almost no bank customers read the U.C.C., atleast some of them take a look at their bank account agreements. A better argument for why the discrepancy between what the U.C.C.says and reality is a problem is that the fanciful rules in the U.C.C. mayhave worked a fraud on state legislatures. This argument rests on therecognition that state legislators themselves did not write the U.C.C.Instead, they were presented with its text (both the original version and themany subsequent amendments and revisions over the years) and then askedto enact it.51  They may have believed they were voting for legislation that
A COMPLAINT ABOUT PAYMENT LAW14gave bank customers a right to stop payment on checks, that governedletters of credit, that required banks to share certain losses with theircustomers, and so forth. But as the various examples in the previous Parthave shown, that really is not the case. An additional objection to the practice of including make-believe rulesin the U.C.C. is that these rules ultimately impose a costly legal burden.Attorneys drafting contracts for commercial transactions must learn whatthe U.C.C.’s rules say and then figure out how to square these rules withreality. An attorney’s clients initially bear this expense. But if the clientsare businesses, they subsequently may pass some of it on to their custom-ers. Ultimately, the rules are likely to make commerce more expensive foreveryone. Finally, the fanciful rules are a problem because they have a negativeimpact on legal education. Many law students never realize that much ofwhat the U.C.C. says does not apply in actual transactions. Other law *213students do learn the truth, but that effort takes time that they might haveused more profitably in learning something else. Maybe this aspect of theproblem is not very significant to the overall economy. But it deservesmention because I suspect that it personally affects, and annoys, many ofthe law teachers writing in this symposium. IV. How to Make the U.C.C. Better So what should the U.C.C. say? The answer is simple: It should tell thetruth. For example, rather than the make-believe rules on stopping paymentnow found in section 4-403, the U.C.C. ought to simply say: “Thecircumstances under which the customer may order the payor bank to stoppayment on a check is determined by the customer’s agreement with thepayor bank.” That statement would capture reality. It would tell statelegislatures, attorneys, banks, customers, and law students exactly what thegoverning principle really is. And it would make the task of drafting bankaccount agreements more straightforward because there would be nocontrary default rules to waive. The drafters of Article 4A on fund transfers adopted this approach in animportant provision on remedies. The provision addresses the damages thatare recoverable if a bank breaches an agreement with respect to theexecution of a payment order, and the breach results in the delay ornoncompletion of a funds transfer. In such a case, the sender of thepayment order-usually someone who needs to get money to someone elsein a hurry-may suffer consequential damages. But are these damagesrecoverable? Section 4A-305(c) simply, and truthfully, says that “conse-quential damages . . . are recoverable to the extent provided in an express
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written agreement [with] the receiving bank.”52 The drafters could not havebeen more honest (unless, of course, they dropped a footnote saying that nobank will ever enter into an express written agreement obligating them topay consequential damages). V. Conclusion The U.C.C., overall, is a fine example of legislation. It has unified andclarified much of the commercial law of the United States. It has served theUnited States for over fifty years, and almost surely will remain largelyintact for many years to come. This Essay has complained about one of theU.C.C.’s shortcomings. In many places, especially in the articles governingpayment law, the U.C.C. just does not capture reality. On the contrary, itcontains rules at odds with common commercial practices. This faultprobably does not directly mislead parties to commercial transactions *214because most of them do not read the statute. But it may have misled thelegislatures that voted for the U.C.C. It may make commercial transactionsmore expensive by increasing the amount of work that attorneys mustperform. And it may burden legal education. Fortunately, the problem has a solution that is easy to articulate andprobably not difficult to put into practice. The U.C.C. should contain therules that parties actually want to use to save them the trouble of changingthem by contract. It should not raise false hopes by including rules that giveparties rights that they realistically cannot enforce. And it should tell thewhole truth, avoiding misleading half-truths. In short, what you see in theU.C.C. should be what you get.
